ROBERT P JONES, CEO and founder of the Public Religion Research Institute, says, in an article first published by Religion News Service, that the overlooked religious middle is poised to play an outsized role in the 2024 presidential contest…
United States
RNS
In America’s religious landscape, the groups attracting the most public attention are those staking out the poles in our political divides: the shrinking, aging but still influential group of white evangelical Christians on the right vs Black Protestants and the growing religiously unaffiliated cohort on the left. With the media, political and philanthropic spotlights all focused on the edges, however, America’s important religious middle remains in the shadows.
To be sure, the religious groups at the poles powerfully demonstrate the eye-popping levels of political polarisation in the country. In the 2020 election, according to the 2020 Pew Validated Voter Study and the 2020 AP Votecast Exit Poll, 84 per cent of white evangelicals voted for Donald Trump, while 71 per cent of religiously unaffiliated voters and 91 per cent of Black Protestants voted for Joe Biden.
You can also see the political chasms in the religious landscape on hot-button issues such as abortion and immigration: Three-quarters (75 per cent) of white evangelical Protestants say abortion should be illegal in all or most cases; by contrast, 70 per cent of Black Protestants and 82 per cent of religiously unaffiliated Americans believe it should be legal in all or most cases.
“These divides are troubling, and important for understanding the challenges our democracy is facing. But they are not the entire story.”
Nearly three-quarters (74 per cent) of white evangelicals, compared to only about one-quarter of Black Protestants (25 per cent) and religiously unaffiliated Americans (23 per cent), favour extreme measures at the US border, such as “installing deterrents such as walls, floating barriers in rivers, and razor wire to prevent immigrants from entering the country illegally, even if they endanger or kill some people”, according to PRRI’s 2023 American Values Survey.
These divides are troubling, and important for understanding the challenges our democracy is facing. But they are not the entire story.
On the right, after steep declines over the last two decades, white evangelical Protestants comprise only 14 per cent of today’s US population and 19 per cent of 2020 voters. On the left, Black Protestants have been holding steady at eight per cent of both the population and voters, while the growing group of religiously unaffiliated Americans has ballooned to 27 per cent of the population and 25 per cent of voters. These groups anchoring the right and the left, combined, account for only about half the country.
Among the groups comprising the remainder of the religious landscape, the divides are less lopsided. In this neglected religious middle, three groups’ partisan and ideological divides are the most balanced: white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (14 per cent of the population and 15 per cent of 2020 voters), white Catholics (13 per cent of the population and 14 per cent of voters), and “Other race Protestants” (six per cent of the population and four per cent of voters). These groups all lean Republican, but not overwhelmingly so; they each supported Trump over Biden in 2020 by slightly less than a 60 to 40 per cent margin.
Trump and the Big Lie. While just under six in 10 of each group supported Trump in 2020, majorities of each nonetheless reject the idea that the election was stolen (59 per cent of white mainline Protestants, 59 per cent of white Catholics, and 56 per cent of Hispanic Protestants). By contrast 60 per cent of white evangelicals believe the Big Lie that the 2020 election was stolen from Trump.
Political ideology. While a plurality of both white mainline Protestants and white Catholics identify as conservative, more than one-third identify as moderate and about one in five identify as liberal. Among Hispanic Protestants, equal numbers identify as conservative or moderate (about four in 10 each), and one in five identify as liberal. Among white evangelical Protestants, seven in 10 identify as conservative.
Across a number of measures, you can see ways in which these groups look significantly different from the white evangelical Protestants. They don’t fit comfortably into left-right stereotypes. (Note: In the analysis below, I cite data for Hispanic Protestants, who represent the largest subgroup in the composite “Other race Protestant” category).
Abortion. Nearly-two thirds (65 per cent) of white mainline Protestants and 59 per cent of white Catholics say abortion should be legal in all or most cases. Hispanic Protestants are more divided (46 per cent legal vs 53 per cent illegal in all or most cases) but look significantly different than white evangelical Protestants, among whom only 24 per cent believe abortion should be legal in all or most cases.
Same-sex marriage. Approximately three-quarters of white mainline Protestants (77 per cent) and white Catholics (73 per cent) favour allowing same-sex couples to marry legally. Hispanic Protestants are divided (50 per cent favour vs 48 per cent oppose) but considerably more supportive than white evangelicals (36 per cent favour).
Immigration. Majorities of white mainline Protestants (56 per cent) and white Catholics (55 per cent) believe the growing number of newcomers from other countries threatens traditional American customs and values, compared to only 32 per cent of Hispanic Protestants. At the same time, about six in 10 white mainline Protestants (59 per cent) and white Catholics (58 per cent), along with two-thirds of Hispanic Protestants (66 per cent), favour a policy that would provide a path to citizenship for immigrants living in the US illegally. On both of these measures, there is significant daylight between these groups in the religious middle and white evangelical Protestants, among whom 7 in 10 say newcomers threaten American culture and only 45 per cent support a path to citizenship.
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These groups in the overlooked religious middle are also poised to play an outsized role in determining the outcome of the 2024 presidential contest. In the Rust Belt battleground states, they comprise about four in 10 or more of the state’s residents. In Wisconsin, they represent nearly half the population.
Across the Sun Belt battleground states, the religious middle is smaller but nonetheless comprises one-fifth to one-quarter of the population. While Hispanic Protestants remain a small proportion of Rust Belt states, they comprise five per cent of Arizona residents and six per cent of Nevada residents – enough to make a difference in a tight election. (In 2020, Biden won Arizona by 10,457 votes and won Nevada by 33,596 votes.)
Notably, in all the battleground states except Georgia and North Carolina, white mainline Protestants alone outnumber white evangelical Protestants.
Historically, dramatically more resources have been marshalled to understand, engage and mobilise the groups on the ideological poles of the religious landscape. In tight elections, like the 2024 presidential race, base turnout always takes precedence in campaign strategy. But if the campaigns are looking for ways to move the needle, outreach to these religious middle groups will almost certainly yield a higher return on investment than to more locked down groups like white evangelical Protestants.
Cleavages within the groups in America’s religious middle are plainly visible.
Many white mainline Protestant denominations, for instance – most recently the United Methodist Church – have been roiled by debates over the morality of same-sex relationships and over their historical complicity with white supremacy. Their churches house a challenging clergy-laity gap, with clergy generally more liberal then their congregants.
White Catholics are largely supportive of abortion rights and marriage rights for LGBTQ people, in direct contradiction to church teaching. They are also experiencing tensions between the more progressive leadership of Pope Francis and the more conservative bent of the US Catholic bishops.
Robert P Jones is CEO and founder of the Public Religion Research Institute and the author, most recently, of The Hidden Roots of White Supremacy and the Path to a Shared American Future. This article first appeared on his Substack newsletter.
